Guns, Germs, and Steel by Jared Diamond

Ever since the heady days of the Age of Reason, hyper-rationalists have sought to replace the traditional means of historical inquiry--which emphasizes philosophy, culture, religion, ideology, and politics--with a starkly scientific and empirical method that points to ecological factors, evolutionary genetics, and geographical "accidents" as the driving force behind historical trends. This school of thought, termed Geographical Determinism, posits that people groups alternately expand or contract not because of their political structure or culture, but because of their land's food production capacity, and, consequently, its capacity to support large population densities. All of human history, the theory goes, can be extrapolated from this basic premise.

Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, the magnum opus of the Geographical Determinism movement, won a Pulitzer Prize when it was published in 1997, showing the bold new theory's appeal among global elites. At its core, the book is an attempt to distance evolution from the racist ideologies (such as Nazism) that Darwin's theory spawned. Evolution and the notion of human equality can be reconciled, Mr. Diamond argues, because the success of one group of people over another is due not to innate difference between races, but to ecological and geographical circumstances.

This argument is not so much wrong as incomplete. First, Mr. Diamond sets up a straw man and repudiates an argument that no one is making; few serious historians now argue that race is the driving force of history. Second, Mr. Diamond is much too hasty to label cultural and civilization arguments (e.g., Europe came to extend its influence across the world because of its philosophy of progress and exploration) as fundamentally racist, when in fact they raise profound cultural and philosophical questions that the scientific method is unable to answer, or even admit exist. By subtly smearing opponents of his theory as either covertly or overtly racist, Mr. Diamond is engaging in precisely the kind of reactionary thinking that he so eloquently laments.

The intricacies of Mr. Diamond's arguments are too complex to be fully presented here, but there are some broad outlines worth noting. History can only be understood, he asserts, by distinguishing between the "proximate" and "ultimate" causes of civilizational success. Proximate causes include technological, literary, organizational, and viral immunity advantages that one group of people has over another. For example, the Spanish Conquistadors were able to overrun the vastly larger Aztec and Inca empires through superior weapons technology (guns vs. bows and arrows), a written language (which the Incas and Aztecs lacked), a complex political structure, and a developed immunity against diseases such as smallpox, which ravaged the unprepared New World populations.

But why did the Spaniards possess these advantages, and not the Native Americans? Why weren't Spanish explorers met with Aztec warriors armed with steel weapons and firearms? Why were the Native Americans so vulnerable to Old World pestilence, while the Europeans were able to withstand New World diseases? And why were the Spanish the ones to land on American shores, rather than Aztec expeditions arriving unannounced in Europe?

The answers to these questions, Mr. Diamond claims, are found in the ultimate causes that later gave rise to the proximate advantages enjoyed by Cortez and Pizzaro. The "most ultimate" of these causes is a given region's food production capacity, which is determined by its supply of domesticable large mammals and the fertility and crop selection of the land. The food surpluses brought by intensive food production allows populations to expand, which in turn frees up members of society to pursue specialized professions other than farming and hunting. Higher population densities are the catalyst of the proximate causes; for instance, complex political organizations stem from the need to effectively control and govern large and growing populations. To efficiently manage a society larger than a few villages, a written language is needed. Natural immunization to disease are built up among large populations groups, because smaller bands of people are often totally wiped out by disease, leaving no immunized survivors to pass on their developed resistance. Thus, to return to the Conquistador scenario mentioned earlier, Europe's advantages over the Incas and Aztecs were due solely to its earlier development of sustained food production--in Mr. Diamond's words, an "accident of geography."

But can the broad trends of history be so easily explained? Much like Einstein's fruitless quest for a Unified Field Theory of physics, historians have been grappling for centuries for an authoritative, all-encompassing Theory of History that can explain everything and predict where history is headed, but to no avail. Perhaps Mr. Diamond's entry into this long-standing debate signifies a revival of the sweeping histories of Toynbee and Durant. But there is a reason why historians have long been frustrated over history's seemingly intrinsic ability to defy pat theories: History is too complex, too varied, and too prone to the unpredictable outbursts of human nature to be scientifically catalogued.

In the case of Guns, Germs, and Steel, Mr. Diamond's elaborate theory breaks down once it reaches modern times. Environmental and geographical factors alone cannot explain why some highly developed civilizations prospered, while others stagnated. For instance, how can Mr. Diamond's thesis explain the strange case of the medieval Chinese Ming dynasty, which, at the cusp of an age of exploration that would have dwarfed the meager efforts of the Portuguese, instead chose to destroy all its fleets, cease all technological development, and withdraw inward? All the proximate causes of societal success--a large, literate population; ample domestic food production; a complex and highly organized government--were present in China during the 1400s (indeed, these factors were much more highly developed in China than in Europe at the time), and yet China began a half-millennium of decline while Europe ascended to worldwide prominence. Only cultural factors could have created such wide differences over the centuries, but this is an argument that Mr. Diamond deems too "racist" to even contemplate. For all their claims of expansiveness and bold thinking, the theory of Geographical Determinism in general, and this book in particular, are severely limited by this slavish devotion to political correctness.

If there is one constant amid the fluctuations of the past that can inform us on broad historical trends, it is the permanence of human nature. Unfortunately, in his effort to minimize culture, philosophy, and religion as the engines of history, that constant is the one that Mr. Diamond seems to have missed. Science is a useful suppliment to traditional methods of historical inquiry, but it is no substitute.

What is a Constitution?

As Iraqis go to the polls this weekend to ratify or reject a new constitution, it is important to remember what a constitution actually is, and what it is not.

A constitution, simply put, is a blueprint for how a government will be structured. It is not--contrary to the impression given by most of the media--some comprehensive peace settlement that will placate all sides and usher in a time of unabated tranquility. Somewhere along the way, the public perception of "constitution" seems to have morphed into the latter, media-driven definition, rather than the former. Such an all-encompassing document is impossible, even under the most idyllic of conditions. It is no wonder, then, that most media expectations are so gloomy--they demand the impractical, and then pontificate endlessly when their impractical demands of perfection are not met. This obsessive, myopic focus on short-term signs of progress (and breathless reports of impending catastrophe if those signs are not clearly and immediately evident) is wholly unique to our modern era.

Constitutions need not resolve every conflict facing a nascent nation to be effective. They need only to give the legislatures enough leeway to pass laws in the future that can address those conflicts. Constitutions do not supply consensus, nor do they reflect it, but rather they provide the institutional framework through which future consensus can one day be reached. Constitutions, by their very nature, are agreements to disagree on a broad range of issues, because the delegates know that those issues can be debated more thoroughly and openly after the constitutional foundation has been laid. These are important points to keep in mind, no matter what the outcome of Sunday's vote.

If Iraqis get a good constitution on the first try, they will have done better than we did. It took us two attempts, after floundering for over a decade under the Articles of Confederation. Somehow I doubt that fact will garner much attention in the days ahead, thanks to a public discourse largely bereft of historical perspective.

Why I'm Disappointed in the Miers Pick

Oh, where to begin. Like many conservatives, I had been eagerly awaiting President Bush's choice to replace the retiring Sandra Day O'Connor. After the brilliant nomination of John Roberts, I had high expectations that Bush would once again appoint someone with impeccable legal credentials and a proven track record of deeply originalist constitutional interpretation.

Instead, Bush nominated his personal lawyer. Harriet Miers is no doubt a fine person and a capable attorney, but she is far from the towering conservative intellect for which I had hoped. She was on no one's short list of potential candidates, except for President Bush's (and Harry Reid's, which I'll get to in a moment). And so, without further adieu, here is why I am deeply, deeply disappointed in the Miers pick:

1. There were so many other, better-qualified candidates available. For nearly thirty years, conservative legal scholars have been making headway into a profession that was once dominated by liberal judicial activists. This movement has reached maturity in recent years, as such respected conservatives as Chief Justice Roberts, religious freedom expert and Tenth Circuit Judge Michael McConnell, Fourth Circuit Judge Michael Luttig, and recent appellate court additions Janice Rogers Brown and Priscilla Owen have gained noteriety for their firm grasp of the Founders' original intent. All are widely regarded as leading conservative intellectuals and constitutional scholars. All reflect the professional excellence needed to serve on the highest court in the land. Bush could have nominated any of these fine candidates and won renewed accolades for his commitment to placing quality judges on the federal bench, as he did with the Roberts nomination.

The selection of Harriet Miers, on the other hand, is as disappointing as the Roberts pick was brilliant. She is not widely regarded as a leading conservative legal scholar, and her rulings, even if they do turn out to be reliably conservative, are unlikely to establish lasting precedents of the kind that will reshape American jurisprudence for decades. Bush missed a prime opportunity to nominate such a judge.

2. Bush is asking, yet again, for conservatives to trust him, but this is a moment in which he should be vindicating that trust, not taking advantage of it. Conservatives have been waiting and preparing for this opportunity to return the Court to its foundation of constitutional originalism for years, and they expected a nominee whose conservative and legal credentials would be self-evident. Harriet Miers is not that nominee.

But conservative disastisfaction with Bush runs deeper than this Supreme Court nomination. For years, conservatives have overlooked some of the Bush administration's violations (campaign finance "reform," growing federal deficits, and so on) of conservative principles in the hope that their patience would be rewarded with an outstanding Supreme Court selection. Now that that hope seems to have been dashed, conservatives are much less willing to look past Bush's shortcomings in other areas. This nomination may have finally broken the dam that held back conservative criticism of the administration until now.

Another factor that rankles conservatives is that sneaking through a "stealth" nominee based entirely on trust is, with a 55-seat Republican majority in the Senate, no longer necessary. Since virtually any Bush nominee is assured confirmation, why take the chance on a nominee who has no discernible track record of reliable conservatism and constitutional originalism? Why not nominate a judge who is widely known for holding conservative views of the law? The specter of the Souter nomination, in which a little-known and supposedly conservative nominee turned out to be an extremely liberal justice in reality, still haunts conservatives. There is an element of risk involved with all Supreme Court nominations (justices are notorious for drifting leftward after taking office), but the Miers pick is an unnecessary one.

3. The President's choice of his personal lawyer and friend smacks of blatant cronyism at time in which his personnel decisions were already coming under heavy--and mostly warranted--criticism. A common accusation levelled by Democrats against the Bush administration is that it hands out appointments based on personal familiarity rather than professional ability. With the Miers pick, President Bush went a long way in vindicating such criticism. Does anyone really believe that former Dallas city councilwoman and Texas lottery commissioner Harriet Miers would now be a Supreme Court nominee had she not been personal friends with the President? That is why Bush's claim that Miers was "the best he could find" rings so hollow, because it is so obviously and demonstrably untrue.

4. Harriet Miers lacks the experience and credentials necessary for a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court. This is not to say that she lacks the intelligence or capacity to make good rulings, but there is little in her background that would suggest she has studied constitutional law and theories of interpretation beyond law school exams. She has never argued cases in front of the Supreme Court, nor has she ever been a judge. These by themselves are not disqualifiers, but when combined with her general lack of a written record beyond President Bush's vague assurances, her credentials stand in stark contrast to the potential nominees I mentioned earlier.

5. Harry Reid recommended and supports Miers' nomination. Often you can take the measure of a person by who lines up to oppose them. A few months ago, Senator Reid, the Democratic minority leader, submitted to President Bush a list of potential nominees who would be "acceptable" to the precious sensitivities of Democrats. Miers was on that list. When her nomination was announced, Reid immediated praised her and thanked President Bush. Reid's endorsement was the third listed in a White House press release trumpeting Miers' "bipartisan" support. Keep in mind that Reid found even the eminently sensible John Roberts to be too "right-wing" for his liberal tastes. Senator Charles Schumer, a long-time foe of conservative judidical nominees, has also voiced his relief at the Miers nomination.

When you realize that Miers was on the preferred list of the Democratic minority leader, and not on the preferred list of any conservatives, you may begin to understand why conservatives are so suspicious.

6. With his poll numbers already sagging, President Bush chose to undermine his only remaining source of support. It has not been a good year for the White House politically. Continued turmoil in Iraq, allegations of corruption among high-ranking Republican officials, high gas prices, and the Katrina response debacle have all combined to force Bush's approval rating to record-low levels. Much of the lost support stemmed from disillusionment among conservatives who were uneasy about the free-spending Republicans in Washington. This nomination was an opportunity to--among other things--stop that slide by shoring up conservative support. Instead, it has accelerated it. To the extent Karl Rove had a role in this decision, I think his political skills have been vastly overrated.

7. By appointing a barely qualified woman, President Bush has surrendered to the forces of identity politics that view gender and race as more important than ability and merit. Had Bush nominated an obviously qualified woman--such as Priscilla Owen or Edith Jones--no one would have objected, save for the radical feminists who presume to speak for all women everywhere. But Miers' sole qualifications seem to be her gender and her friendship with the president. If Miers were a man, does anyone seriously believe she would be the nominee right now? Such an obvious "affirmative action" choice weakens both the Court and the advancement of women by passing over qualified female judges in favor of an unqualified crony.

And there you have it. As for her chances for confirmation, I would be very, very surprised if the Republicans tried to oppose one of the President's nominees. The Democrats may put up a perfunctory show of opposition for a while, but privately they realize that they dodged a bullet on this one. Barring any unexpected revelations in the confirmation hearings, probably the only way the Miers nomination could be stopped is if conservative outrage boiled over to the point where she voluntarily removed her name from consideration, which is unlikely.

But maybe I've got it all wrong. Maybe Harriet Miers has a conservative judicial philosophy of the highest caliber, and a year from now Ralph Neas and NARAL and the ACLU will rue the day they ever let her slip through. I sincerely hope so. The confirmation hearings, which are scheduled for November, may hold the answer. But right now, the Miers confirmation looks like another missed opportunity for President Bush, at a time when he needs all the victories he can get.