Plan of Attack by Bob Woodward

Plan of Attack mainly covers the time frame of November 2001, when the 1990s war plan for Iraq first underwent revision, to the first few days of the war, in March 2003.

I'm not sure why the "Bush LIED!!!!" crowd so heartily endorsed this book, because there is virtually nothing in it to support their claims. Neither is there any evidence that Bush and Cheney launched the war to enrich Halliburton or any other corporation. The book is filled with interesting and occasionally revealing anecdotes, but nothing truly earth-shattering. Powell was obviously Woodward's main source, but Bush and Rumsfeld are the only two main players who agreed to be interview on the record for the book.

This account is quite different in tone to Woodward's previous book, the overwhelmingly pro-Bush Bush at War. There is a sense of foreboding in Woodward's writing, as he tells of how the Bush adminstration did indeed plan extensively for post-war Iraq, but unfortunately it planned for worst-case contigencies that never happened.

Former DCI Tenet has probably the most embarrassing moment in the book, as he infamously tells a skeptical Bush that the WMD case against Iraq is a "slam dunk." From Woodward's account, it seems to me that the WMD intelligence failure was the result of a perfect storm of faulty-yet-reasonable assumptions, neglected human intelligence work, a reluctance to underestimate a threat in the aftermath of 9/11, and a tendency by the analysts to be "clear" in their assessments, even if being clear meant being wrong. Interestingly, there is nothing in Plan of Attack to suggest that the administration sought to influence or intimidate the CIA in any way.

Bush's grasp of the consequences of the war is occasionally questioned by the author and his subjects alike, sometimes implicitly, sometimes not. Bush-haters will find vindication in this. What they will not find, however, is an administration that hid its motives from the public. What was said in private strategy meetings about the rationale for the war was what was said in public press conferences. There were no conspiracies to grab Iraq's oil or fool the public. In fact, at one point, Bush orders his entire national security team to refrain from "stretching" to make their case. Once the war begins, Bush displays a similar concern about Iraqi civilian casualties, and directs General Franks to do all he can to minimize them.

I doubt this book will change very many minds one way or the other. Both sides can find things to support whatever political position they already hold. I recommend this book for those who want the most thorough and penetrating history thus far of the lead-up to the Iraq war, but political partisans on the left would be better served going elsewhere to prove their accusations, if indeed they can be proved.